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The Equine Activity Liability Acts:
A Discussion of Those in Existence
and Suggestions for a Model Act
BY KRYSTYNA M. CARMEL*
INTRODUCTION
"Equine Activity Liability Act" ("ALA")' is a title commonly given to
the type of statute which seeks to protect equine professionals from liability
by eliminating the risk of lawsuits for injuries arising out of the inherent
dangers associated with activities involving horses. Provisions in these statutes
are intended to benefit the horse industry by making it more profitable and
insurable through limited liability.
EALAs have arisen in the wake of state legislatures' recognition of the
inherent risks associated with equine activities, as well as the economic and
personal benefits which the state and its citizens derive from such activities.
Therefore, the purpose underlying EALAs is to encourage equine activities
by limiting the civil liability of those involved in such activities, in fight of
the reality that rising insurance costs and increased litigation would put many
equine professionals and equine facilities out of business. At last count forty-
four states have either passed2 or considered3 such legislation.
* Assistant Editor, Equine Law & Business Letter;, and Law Clerk, Banrick &
McKay, Charlottesville, Virginia. Villanova Law School, Class of 1995.
' Although many states do not use the exact title 'TALA," this title will be used
throughout this discussion for convenience.
2 ALA. CODE § 6-5-337 (1994); 1994Ariz. Sess. Laws259;ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-120-
201 to -202 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-119 (1994); 1993 Conn. Acts 286 (Reg.
Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 773.01-.05 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 4-12-1 to -4 (Supp.
1994); 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 249; IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1801 to -1802 (1990); 1994 Kan. Sess.
Laws 290; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795.1 (West Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7,
§§ 4101-4104 (West Supp. 1994); MASS. GIN. LAWs ANN. ch. 128, § 2D (West Supp. 1994);
1994 Miss. Laws 443; 1994 Mo. Legis. Serv. 457 (Vernon); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-725
to -728 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-13-1 to -5 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
53-10-01 to -02 (Supp. 1993); OP. REV. STAT. §§ 30.687, .689, .691, .693, .695, .697 (1993);
RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 4-21-1 to -4 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-9-710 to -730 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1993); SD. CoDnmD LAws ANN. §§ 42-11-1 to -5 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-20-101 to -105 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27b-101 to -102 (Supp. 1994); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 3.1-796.130 to .133 (Michie 1994); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.530-.540
(West 1994); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-4-1 to -7 (Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.525 (West
Supp. 1993); WYo. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Supp. 1994).
' The following 15 states have considered EALA legislation: California, A.B. 3084,
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Part I begins this study of EALAs with a sampling of the common
law relating to the liability issues which arise from the inherent risks of
equine activities.4 Part II examines the text of the statutes themselves,
with an introduction to the typical provisions and the different types of
EALAs which have been passed to date.5 While the essence of the
EALAs is similar, the forms taken are not. Some are extremely detailed,
others are "bare-boned," and still others address recreational activities
with only passing reference to horseback riding. Part m examines EALAs
in action: how they have been interpreted by the courts, how they have
helped to resolve matters in arbitration, and how they have affected the
insurability of the horse industry.6 Part IV proposes an effective and
comprehensive model EALA.7
I. COMMON LAW LIABILITY ISSUES STEMMING
FROM INJURIES WMICH ARISE FROM THE
INHERENT RISKS OF EQUINE AcnvmEs
As discussed in the Introduction, EALAs intend to protect the
viability of the horse industry by eliminating the potential liability of
equine professionals in situations where injury results from the inherent
risks or dangers arising from equine activities. While EALAs are
Reg. Sess. (1994); Illinois, S.B. 1590, 88th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1993-94);
Indiana, H.B. 1048, 108th General Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1994); Iowa, H.B. 2089,
75th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1994); Kentucky, H.B. 819, Reg. Sess. (1994), H.B.
676, Reg. Sess. (1994), S.B. 134, Reg. Sess. (1994); Michigan, H.B. 5006, 87th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (1994), H.B. 4925, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1994); Nebraska, L.B. 442, 93d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1993); New Hampshire, H.B. 1292, 152d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1991-92);
New Jersey, A.B. 927, 206th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1994-95), S.B. 1223, 206th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (1994-95); Now York, A.B. 975, 215th General Assembly, 1st Reg. Seass.
(1993), A.B. 6536, 215th General Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1993), A.B. 5804, 215th
General Assembly, 2d Reg. Seass. (1994), S.B. 5019, 215th General Assembly, 1st Reg.
Sess. (1993), S.B. 7222, 215th General Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1994), S.B. 8339, 215th
General Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1994); North Carolina, H.B. 1018, 140th General
Assembly (1993); Oklahoma, H.B. 1165, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1993), H.B. 1524,
44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1993), H.B. 1652, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1993), S.B. 223,
44th Leg., 1st Reg. Seass. (1993); Pennsylvania, H.B. 1277, 176th General Assembly, Reg.
Sess. (1993-94), S.B. 1458, 176th General Assembly, Reg. Seass. (1993-94); Texas, S.B.
975, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993), S.B. 974, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993); and Vermont,
H.B. 43, 62 General Assembly, 1st Biennial Sess. (1993-94).
4 See infra pp. 2-15.
See infra pp. 15-23.
6 See infra pp. 23-30.
7 See infra pp. 30-40.
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designed to make the horse industry more insurable and profitable in the
face of rising insurance costs and increased litigation, they do notimmunize the equine professional from the most common ground of
liability, namely ordinary negligence. This part examines a variety of
cases which arose under common law and discusses how the outcome of
these types of cases might be affected were they to arise under an
EALA.8
A. Where EALAs Do Not Apply
Since EALAs only apply to injuries resulting from the "inherent risks
arising from equine activities,"9 it is important to note that EALAs are
explicitly inapplicable to certain situations. For example, several states
have specifically excluded the racing industry from the protections offered
by an EALA.0 Also, EALAs by definition apply only to incidents
involving someone engaged in an equine activity. Accordingly, cases
involving the "vicious propensity" of a horse to bite or to kick someone
not engaged in some form of equine activity will continue to be litigated
under the common law, completely unaffected by enactment of an EALA.
There is an abundance of cases involving people of all sizes and ages
getting bitten or kicked by horses with which they have come into contact
in a purely passive or accidental fashion: such as by attempting to pet the
unattended horse in a pasture," accidentally finding themselves in the
pasture with the horse," or coming across an unrestrained horse outside
of its pasture. 3 Since such persons would not fall into the class of being
a "participant,"' 4 their cause of action would in no way be affected by
the existence of an EALA, but would arise under common law.
Another area of abundant litigation concerns matters in which loose
horses cause property damage. 5 A frequently litigated issue in this area
involves injuries and property damage arising from collisions between
Part M examines cases arising under EALAs.
9 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. chi. 128, § 2D (West Supp. 1994).
10 See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-119 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-728
(1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.131 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.24.540 (West 1994).
"E.g., Williams v. Tysinger, 399 S.E.2d 108 (N.C. 1991).
12E.g., Hofer v. Meyer, 295 N.W.2d 333 (S.D. 1980).
"E.g., Hulen v. City of Hermiston, 569 P.2d 665 (Or. 1977).
14 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27b-101(5) ("Participant means any person,
whether amater or professional, who directly engages in an equine activity, regardless
of whether a fee has been paid to participate.").
S E.g., Lollar v. Poe, 622 So. 2d 902 (ALa 1993).
1994-95]
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horses and automobiles. 6 EALAs do not protect a horse owner from
liability in such situations.
In some states, strict liability may be imposed under a state animal
control act upon an owner of any animal other than a horse. 7 Further-
more, strict liability for damage caused by a horse's dangerous propensity
is not affected by EALAs, even where the incident involves an equine
activity. For example, strict liability is frequently applied to owners of
horses where a participant's injury is the result of a vicious or dangerous
propensity of the animal of which the owner was aware.'8 The plaintiff,
however, has the burden of proving not only that the defendant knew of
the alleged dangerous propensity, but also that the propensity which
caused the injury was actually vicious or dangerous. 9
B. Assumption of Risk
In Louisiana, the common law rule regarding strict liability states that
where a horse "harms another, the master of the animal is presumed to
be at fault. The fault so provided is in the nature of strict liability, as an
exception to or in addition to any ground of recovery on the basis of
negligence."'2 Louisiana recognizes three possible exculpating defenses
in such a strict liability case: "the owner may exculpate himself by
showing that the harm was caused [1] by the fault of the victim, [2] by
the fault of a third person for whom he is not responsible, or [3] by a
fortuitous event."' Here, EALAs provide assistance to the equine
professional by complementing the common law. The EALA definition
of "inherent risk" possibly clarifies the situations which may fall into the
category of "fortuitous events" outside the control of the owner. Thus, the
owner may escape liability.
16 E.g., Moore v. Linderman, 488 So. 2d 1300 (La. 1986).
7 See, e.g., Harris v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Ill. 1988) (explaining that the
strict liability imposed by the Illinois Animal Control Act does not apply to a person who
rents a horse from another when that person understands and accepts the risks involved).
" Kaplan v. C Lazy U Ranch, 615 F. Supp. 234, 237 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding that
the habit of a horse to expand its chest while being saddled, causing the saddle to remain
dangerously loose, is not a dangerous propensity for which the owner will be held strictly
liable); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TE LAW OF TORTS § 76
(5h ed. 1984).
9Kaplan, 615 F. Supp. at 237.
' Daniel v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 810, 813 (La. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding that the horse owners would generally be strictly liable for injury caused by the
horse except where injury was due to the rider's assumption of risk).
1Id.
S ee, e.g., Alfonso v. Market Facilities of Houston, Inc., 356 So. 2d 86, 89 (La. CL
[Vol. 83
EQumE AcTIvrrY LLABiLrrY ACTS
The defense of assumption of risk emanates from the first defense in
strict liability cases, that the harm was caused by the fault of the victim.
Basically, assumption of risk means that the plaintiff knowingly
encountered a risk. If that risk is unreasonable because the danger
involved outweighs the benefits of the encounter, then the plaintiff's
conduct is considered to be contributorily negligent. This defense
frequently arises in cases involving equine activities. The theory
behind the assumption of risk defense is that a plaintiff "who with full
knowledge and appreciation of the danger voluntarily exposes himself to
the risk and embraces the danger cannot recover damages for injury
which may occur." In horseback riding cases, particularly in Louisiana,
the victim is said to be as much at fault for engaging in the activity as the
owner of the horse is for allowing the activity to occurY The applica-
tion of this principle often results in a finding for the defendant, with the
plaintiff deemed to have assumed the risk of injury merely by voluntarily
engaging in the activity.
The policy of strict liability, which mandates that the risk-creator
rather than the victim bear the burden of the responsibility, creates a
dilemma peculiar to equine activity cases in that the "victim" is normally
not an innocent bystander, but an active participant. In fact, in most cases,
the "victim" actually had control of the animal.' In an effort to resolve
this type of situation, courts in a few states "have recognized the principle
that persons who participate in [sporting] activities assume the risks
inherent in such activities."'  An Illinois appellate court went a step
further in Ennen v. White, in which an experienced rider, after sustaining
injuries from a fall from a bucking horse, sued the animal's owner for
App. 1978) (holding the horse owner not liable for injury caused by the horse when it
shied at the sound of thunder).
S' ee KEErON Er AL., supra note 18, § 68.24 Id.
See, e.g., Daniel, 368 So. 2d at 814.
Id.; see Ordway v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that jockey who had been thrown from his horse during a race had assumed the risk of
injury).
,See Daniel, 368 So. 2d at 814.
2 E.g., id.; Alfonso v. Market Facilities of Houston, Inc., 356 So. 2d 86, 89 (La. Ct.
App. 1978).
' E.g., Alfonso, 356 So. 2d at 89.
30 Daniel, 368 So. 2d at 815; see Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40, 42 (La. CL
App. 1976) (holding the plaintiff did not assume the risk of the defendant playing softball
in an unsportsmanlike manner which resulted in injury to the plaintiff); Mounts v. Knodel,
730 P.2d 594, 595 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to find the owner of a horse negligent
for not repairing a stimp which caused injury to the rider).
1994-95]
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negligence.3 The court, in holding that the plaintiff had assumed the
risk of injury when she took control of the horse as a rider on its back,
explained that
plaintiff should have recognized her conduct involved a risk, she should
have known the qualities and habits of animals, and capacities of things
and forces insofar as they are matters of common knowledge in the
community. This applies even if she was ignorant of the possibility [the
horse] might throw her 32
The court concluded that recovery under the common law negligence
theory was not possible absent a showing that the defendants had known
of the horse's predisposition to buck.33
California's law regarding assumption of risk has been in a state of
confusion and "misinterpreted since the decision in Li v. Yellow Cab
Company."'" However, in 1993, the California Court of Appeal issued
two decisions defining the assumption of risk issue in the context of
equine activities: Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club3' and Harrold v.
Rolling "J" Ranch.& '
In Galardi, the court ruled that a complaint alleging the negligence
of a coach or instructor during training involved conduct for which no
absolute defense of assumption of the risk existed.37 Rather than allow
application of this doctrine to defeat the plaintiffs claim, the court held
31 598 N.E.2d 416, 417 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (holding the owner not liable because the
rider had assumed the risk).
' Id. at 419; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 cnt. g (1965). Other
courts have followed the reasoning of both Ennen and the Restatement See, e.g.,
Swierkosz v. Starved Rock Stables, 607 N.E.2d 280, 282 (ill. App. Ct. 1993) (citing to
Ennen's treatment of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 cmt g (1965) to conclude
a rider thrown from a horse had failed to state a cause of action against the stable owner
under the Illinois Animal Control Act).
3 Ennen, 598 N.E.2d at 419.
34 Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270, 273 (Ct. App. 1993). In
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (1975), the contributory negligence doctrine was
abrogated and replaced with the doctrine of comparative negligence.
31 Galardi, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 273 (holding secondary assumption of risk was not
a complete bar to recovery where a trainer owed a duty of care to a horse rider who fell
during practice).
36 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 674-75 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding a stable owner had no duty
to warn customer-rider of the possibility that a hom may "spook," where the rider's
participation constituted primary assumption of risk and thus served as a complete bar to
recovery).
37 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 275.
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that a jury must evaluate the relative fault of both parties under the
doctrine of comparative fault.' Relying on the California Supreme
Court's decision in Knight v. Jewett,9 the court reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in the trainer's favor and sent the case back
with instructions to try the case along comparative fault rather than
assumption of risk, principles!'
Galardi arose out of an incident in which the plaintiff; an experienced
horsewoman, fell from her horse and was injured during a riding
lesson.4' The plaintiff filed a suit against her trainer and the riding club
where the incident occurred and alleged "general negligence and premises
liability." 42 The plaintiff claimed that while she practiced jump combina-
tions, her instructor altered the course by increasing the height of the
jumps without proportionately increasing the distance between such
jumps." After jumping over the first fence of the combination, her horse
landed too close to the second fence, and "popped" it. The plaintiff
suffered injuries to her coccyx and two vertebrae."
The trial court in Galardi, which first heard the case in 1991, granted
summary judgment for the defendants on the theory of assumption of
risk. Over a year later, in light of that court's 1992 decision in Knight v.
Jewett, the plaintiff petitioned the California Supreme Court for re-
view 5 In Knight, the California Supreme Court clarified the doctrine
of assumption of risk and stated that the doctrine only barred recovery in
cases of "primary assumption of risk."' Basing its decision on the
"analytical framework established by the [Knight opinion]," 47 the court
" Id. at 274.
39 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992) (holding a reckless participant in a touch-football game
breached no duty where primary assumption of risk barred the plaintiff's claim).
Galardi, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 275.
41 Id. at 271.
42 Id.
41 Id. at 272.
44Id.
45 Id.
' Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 707-08 (Cal. 1992).
47 Galardi, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 274. The court noted that it
must look then both to the nature of the sport and to the roles and relationship
of the parties. Clearly, the sport of horse jumping has the inherent risk that both
horse and rider will fall and suffer injury. The basic competitive character of
the sport involves engaging increasingly higher jumps and at shorter intervals
until at some point the competitors can no longer clear the obstacles without
substantial contact. Collisions with the jumps and ensuing falls are thus an
integral part of the sport.... Such risks were clearly among those which
plaintiff here knowingly encountered during her training.
1994-95]
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of appeal in Galardi explained that "primary assumption of risk cases are
those in which the defendant has no duty to protect the plaintiff from a
particular risk."" The court of appeal noted that secondary assumption
of risk occurs where "the defendant does owe a duty of care to the
plaintiff and has some liability even though 'the plaintiff knowingly
encounters a risk of injury caused by the defendant's breach of that
duty."' 4 According to the court of appeal, "[T]he general rule is that
coaches and instructors owe a duty of care to their charges."' Thus, the
conduct of the student rider could only be classified as "secondary," and
not "primary," assumption of risk" Applying Knight, the court of
appeal in Galardi held that the motion for summary judgment should
have been denied.52 The court explained that the duty of the defendants
was to use due care not to increase the inherent risks of injury associated
with the sport.'
In Harrold v. Rolling "J" Ranch, the California Court of Appeal held
that a commercial riding stable owed no duty to supply its customers with
an "ideal" horse, or to warn the rider of the horse's one prior spooking
incident.' The court concluded that under the circumstances of the case
the doctrine of primary assumption of risk barred the plaintiff'srecovery
as a matter of law.55
The plaintiff in Harrold was a member of a resort which offered
horseback riding to members at a nearby stable.' The resort arranged
to transport the plaintiff and other resort members to the stable, where
they were given their choice of horses. Before embarking on the ride,
the riders were instructed on how to signal and to command the horses
and were advised not to run the horses. The group was escorted by
two wranglers, one leading the group, and one following from behind.5
About twenty to thirty minutes into the ride, the plaintiff, who had
previously experienced no problems with her horse while on the ride,
4 Id. at 273.49 Id.
"o Id. at 275.
"Id.
'Id.
- Id. at 273.
' 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 677 (Ct. App. 1993).
sId.
Id. at 672.
7Id.
"Id. at 672-73.
"Id. at 672.
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wrapped the reins around the saddle horn while proceeding to remove her
jacket.' While both of the plaintiff's arms were still in the sleeves of
her jacket and caught behind her, the horse spooked and bucked, causing
the plaintiff to fall off the horse and land on her tailbone.'
Unknown to the plaintiff, her horse had spooked and thrown a
previous rider when that rider had taken off and waved a hat.' Stable
officials had not warned the plaintiff of this prior incident, nor, according
to the court, "did they retrain the horse to avoid the recurrence of a
similar incident."6 The plaintiff brought suit against the stable, alleging
that it had negligently failed to warn her of the "horse's unstable
temperament and tendency to throw riders and had failed to provide her
with a safe horse to ride."" Evidence presented to the trial court on a
motion for summary judgment indicated that the plaintiff had some prior
experience with horses, and in a statement prepared for the stable
following the accident, the plaintiff wrote: "I am an experienced rider and
I understand that I was the second person thrown by the same horse. I
guess even the best are thrown. ... Accidents happen."'65
The case had been dismissed previously, but was remanded for
consideration in light of Knight.6' The court of appeal noted that only
if it concluded that the defendant stable "owed no duty to the plaintiff
does the implied assumption of the risk defense operate as a complete bar
to the plaintiff's cause of action."' However, if a duty was owed, then
the plaintiff's reasonable or unreasonable assumption of the risk created
by the defendant would be one of the factors considered with regard to
the comparative negligence of the plaintiff.'
In its decision, the court of appeal held that a commercial riding
stable owed only a narrow duty of due care to members of the general
public to whom it rented horses and that duty, in the instant case, had not
been breached.' The court noted that such a slight duty of care was
60Id. at 673.
6id.
a Id.
3Id.
6Id.
"Id.
" Id. at 672.
6Id.
a Id.
9 Id. at 675. The court stated:
There is no doubt horseback riding, even the rather tame sport of riding on
the back of walking horses in an afternoon trail ride, carries some inherent risk
of injury. A horse can stumble or rear or suddenly break into a gallop, any of
1994-951
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appropriate in light of the uncertain nature of horseback riding." To
confirm its point, the court explained that "sudden movements of a horse
[are] just as inherent in horseback riding as the presence of moguls on a
ski slope are to skiers."71 As for the specific events in Harrol, the court
of appeal concluded that the one prior incident of spooking with the horse
in question did not rise to the level of a dangerous propensity imposing
upon the stable a duty to warn the plaintiff.' The court stated that "to
impose some sort of duty on a lessor of horses when a 'horse acts as a
horse' is to tell the commercial world that strict liability is imposed for
any action of a horse inherent to horseback riding."73
Thus, in Californian terms, an EALA would be a codification of
primary assumption of risk for equine activities. Nevertheless, these cases
are a good example of the kind of increased litigation the horse industry
has recently experienced in the wake of judicial confusion after the
demise of the doctrine of assumption of risk.
C. EALAs and the Demise of the Doctrine of Assumption of Risk
EALAs which adopt an "inherent risk" format are essentially a
codification of the common law concept which holds that in an activity
involving horses, active participants cannot recover for injuries which
result from the misbehavior of animals in their control, absent negligence
on behalf of the provider of the animal7 As such, EALAs are effective-
which may throw the rider. But this does not necessarily mean the commercial
operator of the horse riding facility owes no duty of care to those who rent its
horses and can never be liable for injuries suffered because a horse stumbles,
rears, or suddenly breaks into a gallop. The commercial operator has a duty to
supply horses which are not unduly dangerous. Furthermore, the operator owes
the duty to warn the patrons renting a given horse if that horse has evidenced
a predisposition to behave in ways which add to the ordinary risk of horse
riding.
Id. at 676 (footnote omitted).
70 Id. at 677.
7 Id.
7 Id.
' Id. In conclusion, the court held that it "did not impose on purveyors of horse
rides a duty when a horse 'acts'as a horse, any more than [it] would impose a general
duty on commercial small boat operators when a wave suddenly moves a boat causing a
passenger to be unbalanced and injured." Id.
7' Compare Daniel v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 810, 814 (La. CL
App. 1979) (holding rider had assumed risk that horse might cause injury) with MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 128, § 2D(6) (West Supp. 1994) (codifying the common law
concept of "inherent risks" as related to certain conditions which are an integral part of
[Vol 83
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ly "remedial" legislation because they seek to remedy a flaw, or a gap,
in the common law created by the demise of the doctrine of assumption
of risk. 5 The replacement of the assumption of risk doctrine with that
of comparative negligence has resulted in more litigation for injuries
related to equine activity. In the days when assumption of risk controlled,
such litigation was often dismissed on the theory that one engaging in
activities involving horses assumed the risk of injury when a horse "acts
as a horse."75 In any case, assumption of risk was a defense to common
law actions alleging negligence. 7
Where assumption of risk has been abolished or clouded in the
judicial system, EALAs put the "risk' concept back into the law by
statute. The need for this change was evidenced by the rise in litigation
involving injuries resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities,
and the correspondingly enlarging hole in the law left by the decline of
assumption of risk. The need for change in the common "equine" law
could not wait for the slow processes of the judicial system. Legislators
were spurred to action by strong lobbying from the horse and tourism
industries.78
Many states have either abolished or severely limited the use of the
"assumption of risk" defense. 9 For example, Oregon passed a law that
expressly abolished assumption of risk,' yet that state still recognizes
the "inherent risk" concept as applied to sporting activities." However,
the Oregon Court of Appeals has declared that the issue is not one of
assumption of risk, but one of duty.' In Mounts v. Knodel, the Oregon
Court of Appeals, citing to the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Blair
v. Mount Hood Meadows Development Corp.,83 stated that in negligence
equne activity).
71 See 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONsTRUc-
"lON § 60.02 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing the characteristics inherent inremedial statutes).
" E.g., Harrold v. Rolling "J" Ranch, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 677 (Ct. App. 1993).
' See KEETON Er AL., rupra note 18, § 68.
' See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 20-4-1 (Supp. 1994) ('The Legislature fnds that
equestrian activities are engaged in by a large number of citizens of West Virginia and
that such activities also attract to West Virginia a large number of nonresidents,
significantly contributing to the economy of West Virginia.").
79 See KEErON ET AL., supra note 18, § 68.
"0 OR. REV. STAT. § 18.475(2) (1991).
st Mounts v. Knodel, 730 P.2d 594, 597 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
Id.
630 P.2d 827 (Or. 1981) (holding judgment for defendant ski facility operator
where skier was injured in a fall), modified, 634 P.2d 241 (Or. 1981) (holding a skier is
not an invitee if negligent).
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cases involving injuries arising from the normal risks of a sport, the
burden fell on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had breached a
duty owed to the plaintiff and that such breach caused the injury.' In
Mounts, the plaintiff was injured when he fell off his horse when the
stirrup leather on his saddle broke. 5 Evidence showed that the other
stirrup leather on the same saddle had also recently broken, but that the
provider of the horse to the, plaintiff had failed to check the condition of
both the stirrups before allowing the plaintiff to use the saddle.' It is
important to note that under an EALA, providing a participant with faulty
equipment is a circumstance specifically not protected.'
Thus, equine common law demonstrates an evolution from the strict
liability defense of the "victim at fault" for assuming risk of injury
through participation in the equine activity, where animals are unpredict-
able, to the "inherent risk' theory. While many states have either
abolished or severely limited the use of the "assumption of risk" defense
in favor of a theory of "comparative negligence,"' states which no
longer use the assumption of risk doctrine can equally adopt the "inherent
risk" concept by approaching the matter from a duty perspective.'
While some state EALAs specifically place an "assumption of risk" on
an equine activity participant an EALA does not necessarily conflict with
the law in states which have in some way rejected the assumption of risk
defense; EALAs do not limit liability for injuries resulting from
negligence." Where the EALA is limited to protecting the equine
professional from liability arising from the inherent risks of equine
activities, no conflict with comparative negligence law exists. No conflict
occurs because "inherent risk" excludes negligence or intentional injury,
and the issue of comparative negligence only arises where both parties are
negligent to some degree." In either case, the common law inherent risk
concept is generally amenable, and thus its use in EALAs is not in
conflict with state common law, regardless of the status of assumption of
risk in the jurisdiction.
" Mounts, 730 P.2d at 597.
"Id. at 595.
Ild.
17 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.133 (Michie 1994) ("No provision of this
chapter shall prevent or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor or equine
professional who... [k]nowingly provides faulty equipment or tack and such equipment
or tack causes the injury or death of the participant.").
u KErON Er AL., sVra note 18, § 68.
89 See Mounts, 730 P.2d at 597.
" E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 128, § 2D(c) (West Supp. 1994).
9' KEETON Er AL., supra note 18, § 68.
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D. Releases
One final but important area for discussion is the status of releases under
the common law and EALAs. Research indicates a split in the cases involving
pre-injury releases decisive to litigation of a case at common law: some are
upheld, while others are held invalid 3 It is interesting to note that in
cases where releases were upheld, injury generally resulted from the inherent
risks of the activity, while negligence was usually implicated in the cases
where the releases were held invali&
EALAs will not alter the common law rule that a person may not exempt
himself from liability from his own negligence, absent a clear intent to do
' See, e.g., Campbell v. Country Club Stables, Inc., 909 F.2d 1486, 1488 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding that language of a release was broad enough to include immunity for
liability from negligence, even where negligence on the part of a riding stable was not
specifically addressed, because the exculpatory agreement was not a contract of adhesion
since the participant was under no compulsion to sign); Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v.
Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 785 (Colo. 1989) (holding it reasonable to interpret the broad
language of exculpatory agreement to cover claims based on negligence or breach of
warranty, even when those exact terms were not used, since the agreement was written
in simple and clear terms free from legal jargon); Hall v. Gardens Servs., Inc., 332 S.E.2d
3, 5 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that exculpatory clauses in contracts were valid and
binding and not void as against public policy where the bailor relieved himself from his
own negligence, except where negligence amounted to willful and wanton misconduct);
Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 695 P.2d 361, 364 (Idaho 1984) (upholding an exculpatory release
where the plaintiff did not establish that the defendant riding stable failed to satisfy
industry standard of care and explaining that where the legislature had granted limited
liability to one group in exchange for adherence to specific duties, then such duties
became a public duty and an exculpatory agreement could not be used to absolve the
defendant from liability for possible violation of public duty, but could be used to absolve
defendant from common law liabilities).
' See, e.g., Hobby v. Giplin (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1984) (LEXIS, State library,
Tenn. file) (holding that contract against liability will not operate to protect a party who
is guilty of gross negligence); O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 446
(Fla. Dist. CL App. 1982) (holding that where a minor child was injured at Disney World
by a stampede of horses, the term "negligence" must actually appear in the exculpatory
agreement in order to protect the defendant from liability arising from the drafer's
negligence); Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Wis. 1982) (holding an exculpatory
agreement invalid wher the party seeking its enforcement misstated a material fact
concerning insurance coverage for equine activities by stating that such coverage was not
available, when in fact it was); Tanker v. North Crest Equestrian Ctr., 621 N.E.2d 589,
591 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a riding facility was not immunized by an
exculpatory agreement from its own negligence where only a portion of the agreement
applicable to cases of negligence addressed the negligence of other students, riders,
trainers, and boarders, and not that of the riding center's own trainers).
' See, e.g., Hel Valley Ranch, Inc, 784 P.2d at 785; O'Connell, 413 So. 2d at 448.
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so?- Furthermore, waivers of liability exempting a person from his own
negligence are generally disfavored and ruled invalid by the courts.
Precedent in individual states may present barriers to the use of specific
or pre-injury releases by equine professionals.'
In one case following New York common law, Brancati v. Bar-U-
Farm, Inc., the court held that a riding stable is of a "recreational" nature,
and, as such, that a release between a recreational provider and a paying
customer is invalid where it purports to protect the stable from its own
negligence. 8 The Brancati decision was based upon section 5-326 of
New York's General Obligations Law which deems such agreements void
as against public policy." Thus, while New York does not have an
EALA, passage of an EALA would not per se affect this precedent
In Murphy v. North American River Runners, Inc., the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia held that pre-injury releases for inherently
dangerous recreational activities are unenforceable when they involve a
violation of safety standards." The court in Murphy ruled that the
Whitewater Responsibility Act statutorily imposed safety standards upon
the industry which were "not within the power of any private individual
- RSATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496B cmt. d (1965); KEroN ET AL., squra
note 18, § 68.
' See Jones v. Walt Disney World Co., 409 F. Supp. 526, 528 (W.D.N.Y. 1976)
(invalidating exculpatory agreement in a personal injury case arising fr om a fall from a
horse); Harris v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Il1. 988) (holding animal control statute
inapplicable when injuries were caused by a fall from a horse); 6A ARTHUR L. CORDIN,
COR.BIN ON CONIACrs § 1472(E) (Supp. 1993).
' See, e.g., Murphy v. North Am. River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 504, 513 (W. Va.
1991) (denying summary judgment and remanding case for a determination of parties'
intent with regard to exculpatory clause); Brancati v. Bar-U-Fann, In=., 583 N.Y.S.2d
660, 662 (App. Div. 1992) (invalidating exculpatory agreement in personal injury case
arising from a fall from a horse).
583 N.Y.S.2d at 662-63.
Id. The text of § 5-326 is as follows:
Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with, or
collateral to, any contract, membership application, ticket or admission or
similar writing, entered into between the owner or operator of any pool,
gymnasium, place of amusement or recreation, or similar establishment and the
use of such facilities, pursuant to which such owner or operator receives a fee
or other compensation for the use of such facilities, which exempts the said
negligence of the owner, operator or person in charge of such establishment, or
their agents, servants or employees, shall be deemed to be void as against
public policy and wholly unenforceable.
N.Y. GEN. OBuIG. LAW § 5-326 (McKinney 1994).
100 412 S.E.2d at 509.
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to waive."10' While Murphy dealt with West Virginia's Whitewater
Responsibility Act,"° that Act is virtually identical to the state's Eques-
trian Activities Responsibility Act, which expressly defines "those areas
of responsibility and those affirmative acts for which the operators of
equestrian businesses shall be liable." ' A comparison of the language
found in both statutes indicates that; in light of the analysis in Murphy,
the Equestrian Activities Responsibility Act would also be considered a
"safety statute" by the courts of West Virginia. The holding in Murphy
illustrates the uselessness of liability releases for equine activities in West
Virginia where the statutorily imposed standard of care is very broad and
where a violation of the safety standards would demonstrate negligence
on the part of the equine professional. In Murphy, the court stated that
"when a statute imposes a standard of conduct, a clause in an agreement
purporting to exempt a party from tort liability to a member of the
protected class for the failure to conform to that statutory standard is
unenforceable."" 4 This proposition is not a new one.t 5
Accordingly, it seems that in most states an EALA will have no
effect on the enforceability of liability releases. The common law of the
state will govern the outcome of cases in this area. Probably the most
effective release in a state with an EALA would include language directly
taken from the statute itsell or some incorporation of the "inherent risky'
idea, in order to put the participant on notice of the inherent risks of the
sport and of the existence of any relevant statute. Such measures would
be taken with an eye toward avoiding unnecessary problems of ambiguity
should the matter end up in court.
IL ANALYSIS OF THE EQUINE ACTVITY LIABILrrY ACTS
Twenty-nine states have passed some form of an EALA." While
the statutes vary in form and, to a certain extent, in content, they all
intend to protect equine professionals and sponsors of equine-related
activities from civil liability for injuries resulting from the inherent
dangers and risks associated with such activities. All of the statutes share
"' Id.
0 W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3B-1 to -5 (Supp. 1994).
10 Id. § 20-4-1.
'0 412 S.E.2d at 509.
105 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op CoNRaAcrs § 195 cmt. a (1979).
,
05 Search of WL, State Statutes-Annotated Database and Legislative Service-Multistate
database (Sept 26, 1994).
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the common feature of not providing immunity for gross negligence.107
An important side note is that some states explicitly exempt the horse
racing industry from their EALAs.' °
The simplest way to approach an analysis of twenty-nine similar
laws'°9 is to first address the standard or common features, such as the
"typical" definitions and terminology associated with EALAs,"' before
107E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27b-102(2) (Supp. 1994); 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws
249(4).
"oe See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-119 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-728
(1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.131 (Michie 1994).
"o Due to time constraints and space limitations, not all of the statutes are discussed
herein.
...The following definitions serve as an example of typical definitions, though
wording may vary slightly from state to state.
(1) "Engages in an equine activity" means riding training, providing, or
assisting in providing medical treatment of, driving, or being a passenger upon
an equine, mounted or unmounted, or a person assisting a participant or show
management. It does not include being a spectator at an equine activity, except
in cases where the spectator places himself in an unauthorized area and in
immediate proximity to the equine activity.
(2) "Equine" means a horse, pony, mule, donkey, or hinny.
(3) "Equine activity" means:
(a) an equine show, fair, competition, performance, or parade that
involves a breed of equine and an equine discipline, including but not
limited to, dressage, hunter and jumper horse shows, grand prix jumping,
three-day events, combined training, rodeos, driving, pulling, cutting, polo,
steeplechasing, English and western performance riding, endurance trail
riding and western games, and hunting;
(b) equine training or teaching activities, or both;
(c) boaxng equines;
(d) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine belonging to another,
whether the owner has received monetary consideration or another thing
of value for the use of the equine or is permitting a prospective purchaser
of the equine to ride, inspect, or evaluate the equine;
(e) a ride, trip, hunt, or other equine activity, however informal or
impromptu, that is sponsored by an equine activity sponsor,
(f) placing or replacing a horseshoe on an equine;
(g) examining or administering medical treatment to an equine by a
veterinarian.
(4) "Equine activity sponsor" means an individual, a group, a club, a
partnership, or a corporation, whether the sponsor is operating for profit or
nonprofit, which sponsors, organizes, or provides the facilities for an equine
activity, including, but not limited to, a pony club, 4-H club, hunt club, riding
club, school and college-sponsored class, program, and activity, therapeutic
riding program, and an operator, instructor, and promoter of an equine facility,
including, but not limited to, a stable, clubhouse, ponyride string fair, and an
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turning to the anomalies. The definitions and terminology associated with
EALAs must be considered before a model act can be proposed.
A. Sharing Similarities: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Montana, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, and Tennessee
Nearly half of the EALAs enacted in this country share striking
similarities." One of the unique features of these EALAs is that they
center around the premise that equine professionals will be held liable in
certain delineated circumstances, namely- for providing a faulty horse or
faulty tack, for providing an animal without making a determination of
the participant's ability to safely engage in the activity or safely manage
the animal, for owning or leasing or controlling property and failing to
warn of any latent defects thereon, for demonstrating willful and wanton
disregard for safety, or for causing intentional injury."2 At the same
time, these EALAs focus on immunity from liability when injury or death
to a participant results from the "inherent risks" of equine activities."'
The most common and popular EALA is that which is characterized by
the reliance on the definition of "inherent risk' and on the mandatory
posting of warning signs."4
arena at which the activity is held.
(5) "Equine professional" means a person engaged for compensation in:
(a) instructing a participant orrenting to a participant an equine for the
purpose of riding, driving, or being a passenger upon the equine;
(b) renting equipment or tack to a participant;
(c) or examining or administering medical treatment to an equine as
a veterinarian.
(7) 'Participanf' means a person, amateur or professional, who engages in
an equine activity, whether a fee is paid to participate in the equine activity.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-9-710 (Law. Co-Op. Supp. 1993).
.' The following EALAs are similar: ALA. CODE § 6-5-337 (1994); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 13-21-119 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 4-12-1 to -4 (Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2795.1 (West Supp. 1994); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 128, § 2D (West Supp.
1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-725 to -728 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.687, .689,
.691, .693, .695, .697 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-21-1 to -4 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 47-9-710 to -730 (Law. Co-Op. Supp. 1993); S.D. CODmIFED LAws ANN. §§ 42-
11-1 to -5 (Supp. 1994); and TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-20-101 to -105 (1993).
1 E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-337(c)(2) (1994); CoLO. REv. STAT § 13-21-119(4)(b)
(1994).
11. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.525(3) (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-123(a)
(Supp. 1994).
114 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-119(5)(a) (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 4-12-3(b)(2)
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These EALAs have no impact on liability when the equine profes-
sional has been negligent. A sample of the language used in such EALAs
is:
[A]n equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other
person, which shall include a corporation or partnership, shall not be
liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the
inherent risks of equine activities[,] and... no participant or represen-
tative of a participant shall make any claim against, maintain an action
against, or recover from an equine-activity sponsor, an equine profes-
sional, or any other person for injury, loss, damage, or death of the
participant resulting from any of the inherent risks of equine activi-
ties. 1
5
This language is virtually identical to that used by Colorado,"'1 Geor-
gia,"17  Louisiana," 8  Massachusetts,"19  South Carolina,2' and
Tennessee.' EALAs in Montana,' Oregon,"2  and South
DakotaU use more abbreviated language to make the same point.
Rhode Island makes reference to inherent risks and then adds that no
immunity exists when relevant persons fail to "exercise due care under
the circumstances toward such participant.'
Another common characteristic of the EALAs in this category,
excepting EALAs in Montana and Oregon, is that these states require
warning signs to be placed in prominent locations on or near any areas
where equine activities are conducted.2 6 The EALAs in these states
mandate a standard sign with the warning written in one inch black
letters.' The same warning must also be contained in contracts for
(Supp. 1994). r
" ALA. CODE § 6-5-337(c)(1).
116 Cow. REV. STAT. § 13-21-119(3).
"17 GA. CODE ANN. § 4-12-3(a).
... LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795.1(B).
119 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. cb. 128, § 20(b).
'o S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-9-720(A).
12 TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-20-103.
1- MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-727.
123 OR. R.EV. STAT. § 30.691(1).
'u S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 42-11-2..
R.I. GEN. LAWs § 4-21-2.
'2z COL. Ray. STAT. § 13-21-119(5); GA. CODE ANN. § 4-12-4(a); I.A. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2795.1(E); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 128 § 2D(d)(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-
9-730(A); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-20-105; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 42-11-5.
"2 The standard warning reads:
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professional services entered into by equine professionals." A charac-
teristic of Oregon's EALA is that it makes binding any release knowingly
executed by an adult participant, so long as the release applies only to
injuries resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities.'"
B. Idaho, Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and
Washington
The EALAs of these states"° are all fairly similar to each other, yet
slightly different from the group discussed above. They are similar in that
they contain little more than a statement that an equine professional will
not be liable for any injury or death to a participant, except as specifically
provided.
Idaho's version of an EALA (called 'Equine Activities Immunity
Act") is typical of the EALAs in this group and virtually identical to
those of North Dakota and Washington in its immunity exemption for
equine sponsors or professionals."' Maine's statute is much like that of
WARNING
Under [applicable state law], an equine professional is not liable for an
injury to or the death of a participant in equine activities resulting from the
inherent risks of equine activities, pursuant to [the state code provision].
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-9-730; S.D. CODIFmD LAWS ANN. § 42-11-5; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 44-20-105.
Rhode Island's warning reads:
Under Rhode Island Law, an equine professional, unless he or she can be
shown to have failed to be in the exercise of due care, is not liable for an injury
to, or the death of, a participant in equine activities resulting from the inherent
risks of equine activities, pursuant to this chapter.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 4-21-4.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-119(5); GA. CODE ANN. § 4-12-4(a); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2795.1(E); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 128, § 2D(d)(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-
9-730(A); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-20-105(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 42-11-5.
1- OR. REV. STAT. § 30.693.
' IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1801 to -1802 (1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 7, §§ 4101-
4104 (West. Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-13-1 to -5 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 53-10-01 to -02 (Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27(b)-101 to -102
(Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3.1-796.130 to -.133 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4.24.530-.540 (West 1994).
m Idaho's immunity exemption provision states:
Nothing ... shall prevent or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor
or an equine professionah
(a) If the equine activity sponsor or the equine professional:
(i) Provided the equipment or tack and the equipment or tack
caused the injury; or
1994-95]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Idaho but goes further by requiring any written contract "entered into by
an equine professional for the provision of professional services" to
contain a statement of the inherent risks of equine activities, including a
non-exclusive list of "inherent risks" enumerated in the statute.'" New
Mexico's EALA is also similar to Idaho's, but it additionally requires a
posting of notice, which includes a warning of the inherent risks of
equine activities as well as the limited liability of the "operator, owner,
trainer or promoter."'3 Utah's EALA includes a provision stating that
it does not apply to veterinarians bringing actions "to recover for
damages incurred in the course of providing professional treatment of an
equine" or those liable under "Estrays and Trespassing Animals"
provisions of the state code."
Finally, Virginia has an additional provision in its EALA which
addresses waivers. The provision requires that any waivers "give notice
to the participant of the risks inherent in equine activities," with such
(ii) Provided the equine and failed to make reasonable and
prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage
safely in the equine activity, determine the ability of the equine to
behave safely with the participant, and to determine the ability of the
participant to safely manage the particular equine;
(iii) Owns, leases, rents or otherwise is in lawful possession and
control of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained
injuries because of a dangerous latent condition which was known to
or should have been known to the equine activity sponsor or the
equine professional and for which warning signs have not been
conspicuously posted,
(iv) Commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of the participant and that act or omission
caused the injury;
(v) Intentionally injures the participant...;
IDAHO CODE § 6-1802.
7 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 4104. The "inherent risks" listed in the Maine
statute include:
A. The propensity of an equine to behave in ways that may result in injury,
harm or death to persons on or around the equine;
B. The unpredictability of an equine's reaction to such things as sounds,
sudden movement and unfamiliar objects, persons or other animals;
C. Certain hazards, such as surface or subsurface conditions;
D. Collisions with other equines or objects; and
E. The potential of a participant to act in a negligent mamner that may
contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as faling to maintain
control over the equine or not acting within the participant's ability.
Id.
" N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-13-5.
' UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27b-101 to -102.
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risks listed as shown in the statute."3 The statute further provides that
the waiver
shall remain valid unless expressly revoked by the participant or parent
or guardian of a minor. In the case of school and college sponsored
classes and programs, waivers executed by a participant or parent or
guardian of a participant shall apply to all equine activities in which the
participant is involved in the next succeeding twelve month period
unless earlier expressly revoked in writing."'
Virginia is the only state to delineate a waiver provision in such detail.
C. The "Recreation" States: Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
Connecticut, 37 Wisconsin m and Wyoming 9 have all taken the
"recreation" track. Rather than addressing equine activities specifically,
these EALAs are recreational in nature and encompass horseback riding
within their scope. Connecticut's statute differs slightly from those of
Wisconsin and Wyoming in that it addresses persons "engaged in
recreational equestrian activities" under the same heading of the statute
establishing a mandatory bicycle helmet law for children under
twelve.
40
Wisconsin and Wyoming both incorporate horseback riding into the
text of their recreational activity statutes, while Wyoming also specifically
includes equine activities in general.14' Wisconsin's statute addresses the
"risks inherent in the recreational activity""4 and notifies participants
in the subheading itled "Appreciation of risk" that they accept these
risks. 4 1 Wyoming takes a similar view but actually codifies the as-
sumption of risk principle by providing that "[a]ny person who takes part
in any sport or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risk of
injury and all legal responsibility for damage, injury or death to himself
or other persons or property ... "'44 Wyoming also explicitly states that
.. VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-796.132.
"Id.
"'1993 Con. Acts 286 (Reg. Sess.).
"'Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.525 (West Supp. 1993).
-9 WYo. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Supp. 1994).
140 1993 Corn. Acts 286.
141 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.525; WYO. STAT. § 1-1-123.
"z Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.525(3).
143 Id.
144 WYO. STAT. § 1-1-123.
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recreational providers are liable only for negligence, not for the inherent
risks of the sport.'"
D. West Virginia: Imposing Duties on All Parties in a Safety Statute
West Virginia has taken a unique track to arrive at its EALA by
explicitly imposing a duty on every equine professional and on every
participant'" The duty statutorily placed on equine professionals goes
beyond that provided for in other EALAs. Whereas other EALAs
delineate the circumstances in which immunity is unavailable,147 West
Virginia incorporates those circumstances into an "affirmative" statute,
rather than a "negative" one, by expressly mandating the duties a
horseman owes to his participants."
With regard to the liability of an equine professional, the statute states
in part, "A horseman shall be liable for injury, loss or damage caused by
failure to follow the duties set forth in... this article where the violation
145 Id.
'4 W. VA. CODE §§ 20-4-1 to -7 (Supp. 1994).
147 Immunity is generally unavailable for a breach of the industry standard of care, for
gross negligence, or for intentional injury. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-337(7)(2); GA.
CODE ANN. § 4-12-3.
148 These affumative duties are numbered and require the horseman to:
(1) Make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of a
participant to safely engage in the equestrian activity, to determine the ability
of the horse to behave safely with the participant, and to determine the ability
of the participant to safely manage, care for and control the particular horse
involved;
(2) Make known to any participant any dangerous traits or characteristics
or any physical impairments or conditions related to a particular horse which
is involved in the equestrian activity of which the horseman knows or through
the exercise of due diligence could kmow;
(3) Make known to any participant any dangerous condition as to land or
facilities under the lawful possession and control of the horseman of which the
horseman knows or through the exercise of due diligence could know, by
advising the participant in writing or by conspicuously posting warning signs
upon the premises;
(4) In providing equipment or tack to a participant, make reasonable and
prudent efforts to inspect such equipment or tack to assure that it is in proper
working condition and safe for use in the equestrian activity;
(5) Prepare and present to each participant or prospective participant, for his
or her inspection and signature, a statement which clearly and concisely
explains the liability limitations, restrictions and responsibilities set forth in this
article.
W. VA. CODE § 20-4-3.
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of duty is causally related to the injury, loss or damage suffered."' 49
The West Virginia statute also describes the duties of participants,
requiring them to know the range and limits of their ability and to act
accordingly." The EALA states that participants shall be liable for
violations of their duties."'
E. Arkansas: Protection of Non-Profit Corporations Only
Arkansas52 is the only state which has limited its EALA to non-
profit corporations engaged in equine activities. Due to its limited
applicability, its text is the shortest of all the EALAs, confined to a one-
sentence statement outlining liability only for "malicious, willful, wanton,
or grossly negligent conduct.""5 While it may appear curious that the
Arkansas legislature would target non-profit corporations for limitation of
liability, presumably the growth and increased popularity of such
programs as "Riding for the Handicapped"' attracted legislative attention.
IL EQuNE AcTIvrY LmiLrrY ACTS iN ACTION
A. Test Cases'
Since EALAs are a relatively new phenomenon, case law interpreting
or applying them is sparse. However, where EALAs have been utilized,
they have served the purpose for which they were intended. 55
149 Id. § 20-4-5.
1 Id. § 2044.
, Id. § 204-6.
1 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-120-201 to -202 (Michie 1993).
1 The Arkansas EALA states:
No officer, employee, or member of the board of directors of a non-profit
corporation ... shall be held personally liable in any civil action for damages
resulting from their acts of commission or omission relating to an equine
activity sponsored, organized, promoted, or otherwise assisted by the nonprofit
corporation, except that this subchapter does not shield them from liability for
their malicious, willful, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct
Id. § 16-120-202.
" Portions of this section are reprinted with permission from the Equine Law &
Business Letter, 0 Copyright 1993, Hippodrome Press, Inc.
.s See, e.g., Day v. Snowmass Stables, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 289, 295 (D. Colo. 1993)
(holding Colorado's EALA does not protect from liability those equine professionals who
provide faulty equipment); Patrick v. Sferra, 855 P.2d 320 (Wash. Ct App. 1993)
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Not surprisingly, Colorado and Washington, among the first states to
enact EALAs, were the first to receive test cases. The test cases in both
states centered on the specific language in the statutes and on whether the
equine professional, in one case," 6 and the injured rider, in the other
case," fit within the statutory language in advancing their respective
positions. Additionally, one case involved the unique issue of whether an
exculpatory agreement could bar the litigation entirely."s
Day v. Snowmass Stables, Inc.," the first case to interpret the
Colorado EALA, resulted in the court ordering a trial to be held to
determine whether the defendant stable, against which a negligence claim
was brought for injury arising from faulty equipment, was liable under
the statute."6 In Day, the neck yoke of one of the wagons in a wagon
train broke, causing the wagon operator to lose control. That wagon
collided with the one in which the plaintiff was riding and the plaintiff
was thrown from the wagon and injured.161 The plaintiff claimed the
stable was negligent in that it knew or should have known that the neck
yoke ring and the wagons were faulty."' The defendant stable moved
for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiff had signed
a release, and (2) that the Colorado EALA protected the defendant from
liability.63 The trial court denied the summary judgment motion on
both grounds."
With regard to the release, the court noted that while Colorado law
did permit a party to shield itself from liability for negligence, such an
intent to exculpate must be clear and unambiguous.1 65 The court held
the exculpatory agreement signed by the plaintiff did not "clearly and
unambiguously release the stable from liability for [the plaintiff's]
negligence claim."1" Furthermore, the court accepted the plaintiff's
argument that the risks created by faulty equipment were not the type of
"obvious risk' that the plaintiff assumed when she signed the release."w
(holding that the purpose of Washington's EALA is to limit liability).
1- Day, 810 F. Supp. 289.
157 Patrlck, 855 P.2d 320.
15 Day, 810 F. Supp. at 293.
159 Id. at 295.
" If it were determined that the equine professional knew or should have known
equipment or tack were faulty, then the professional would not be protected from liability
under Colorado's _A.A. Id.
1 Id. at 291.
",Id. at 293.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 295.
10 Id. at 294.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 294-95.
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Turning to the EALA, the court denied the defendant stable's motion
for summary judgment, stating that the statute "expressly declines to
extend the immunity to equine professionals who 'provided the equipment
or tack, and knew or should have known that the equipment or tack was
faulty, and such equipment or tack was faulty to the extent that it did
cause the injury."" The court held a trial was necessary to determine
"whether [the defendant stable] knew or should have known that the
equipment or tack was faulty."'69 Thus, in this case, the Colorado
EALA did not enhance the defenses otherwise available to the stable
regarding the enforceability of the exculpatory agreement, as the
operation of the EALA did not even enter into the discussion of the
validity of the release.
The next reported case involving an EALA occurred in Washington.
In Patrick v. Sferra, the defendant stable was deemed protected by the
EALA where the plaintiff had tried to use the statute to expand the
stable's liability for giving her a horse on which she was injured.' The
Washington State Court of Appeals found the state's EALA inapplicable
to a claim against donors or sellers of a horse in a case where a rider was
injured in a fall from her own horse. 7'
In Patrick, the plaintiff seeking damages for negligence under
Washington's EALA, sued the former owner of her horse and the owner
of the stable where she kept her horse."n The plaintiff alleged that the
stable gave her a certificate for a month's unlimited riding at the stable
on a "safe horse"'73 with the possibility of someday owning the horse.
The horse supplied to the plaintiff was an ex-racehorse named Duke
which the owner eventually gave to the plaintiff. The defendant owner
told the plaintiff that "Duke was a retired racehorse, and that Duke should
be walked for a year to give his ankles and shins an opportunity to heal,"
but the plaintiff apparently ignored this advice and continued to ride the
horse daily at the farm of the defendant stable owner, where she also
continued to board the horse. 74 Once while on a ride, Duke "acted
up,'W7 5 throwing the plaintiff and knocking her unconscious. The
plaintiff was in a coma for over a week and suffered brain damage. "6
1- Id. at 295 (quoti&g COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-119(4)(b)(l)(A) (1992)).
'RId.
'7, 855 P.2d 320, 323 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
7 Id. at 321.
'R Id. at 322.
173 Id. at 321.
174 Id.
5 Id. at 322.
176 Id.
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In her claim for damages under the Washington EALA, the plaintiff
asserted that the stable owner and Duke's former owner were equine
activity sponsors under the definition of the act, and "that they 'provided'
Duke to her without having made reasonable efforts [to] determine that
Duke was suitable for her use" as required under the statute." The
court, however, held that the plaintiff's claim did not fit within the
language of the statute and determined that it would be inappropriate to
expand the statute to include the plaintiff'sclaim since "the plain purpose
of the act is to limit liability and not to expand it."'7 The court stated
that "the whole thrust of the statute" is to protect people and organiza-
tions who sponsor riding activities, not all providers of horses. To
hold otherwise "would yield an extraordinary result: a stable operator
would be liable to an owner riding her own horse, off the stable
operator's property, merely because the stable operator brought the owner
and the donor of the horse together.""' The court concluded "that any
responsiblities of [the defendants] to the plaintiff under the Equine
Activities Act terminated when [the plaintiff] accepted title to Duke."18'
The holding in this case is important not only for offering interpreta-
tions of language in Washington's EALA, but also, on a broader scale, for
establishing that sections of the statute which are intended to protect
equine professionals cannot be construed to impose liability against them.
The court's decision in Patrick illustrates the extent to which plaintiffs
M Id. The specific language at issue in the Washington statute states:
(b) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall prevent or limit the
liability of an equine activity sponsor or an equine professional:
(i) If the equine activity sponsor or the equine professional:
(A) Provided the equipment or tack and the equipment or tack
caused the injury; or
(B) Provided the equine and failed to make reasonable and
prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage
safely in the equine activity, determine the ability of the equine to
behave safely with the participant, and determine the ability of the
participant to safely manage the particular equine;
(ii) If the equine activity sponsor ... owns, leases, rents, or otherwise
is in lawful possession and control of the land or facilities upon which the
participant sustained injuries because of a dangerous latent condition which
was known to or should have been known to the equine activity sponsor
... and for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted[.]
Id. (quoting WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.540(2)(b) (West 1994)).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 323.
'o Id.
"I Id. at 324.
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may be barred from inventing ways to circumvent or add to the specific
language found in the EALA.
These two cases are also important for the precedential value their
interpretations may have in other states with similar EALAs. Washington
and Colorado were among the first states to adopt EALAs." Most of
the EALAs that followed are virtually identical, if not literally, at least in
intent and purpose. Commentators have noted that "the fact that a statute
of another state not only is similar but also has a similar legislative
history to that of the statute being construed furnishes added reason to
consider it relevant for interpretive purposes."" In other words, due to
the similarities between these EALAs and those of other states, courts in
other states may inevitably be asked to follow the prior decisions and the
statutory constructions of the Washington and Colorado EALAs.'
B. EALAs in Arbitration
While arbitration reports generally provide no precedential value in
a court of law, they are relevant in that they reflect an arbitrator's binding
interpretation of the law at issue. Recently, a Colorado arbitrator ruled in
binding arbitration that a stable which rented horses for a hunting trip
was not responsible for a customer's injuries sustained when he was
bucked from his mount 8 5 Of particular significance are four of the six
matters considered by the arbitrator in Conger v. Sombrero Ranches, Inc.:
(1) the effect of one party's execution of a release, purportedly on behalf
of the entire party, on the plaintiffl (2) the effect of the Colorado EALA
on the plaintiff's claim; (3) the effect of the alleged EALA violation on
the plaintiff's claim that the stable failed to determine his ability to safely
ride the horse from which he fell; and (4) the effect of the alleged EALA
violation on the plaintiff's claim that the stable committed an act or
omission that constituted willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the
plaintiff, thereby causing his injury
The facts of Conger were relevant to the conclusion reached by the
arbitrator, and, to a great extent, the ruling was fact specific. In Conger,
"1 WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.530-.540 (West 1994) (effective July 23, 1989);
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-119 (1994) (effective July 1, 1990).
10 2B SINGER, supra note 75, § 52.01 (discussing the problems and relevance of
similar statutes of other states).
"u See id. §§ 52.01-.03.
S Conger v. Sombrero Ranches, Inc., Judicial Arbiter Group, Inc., Case No. 93-341,
at 19 (1993) (Quinn, Arb.).
'"Id. at 1-2.
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the rental stable shipped the horses to the hunting party, and each hunter
arbitrarily chose a horse as they were unloaded from the truck." The
stable had selected the horses in consideration of their suitability to the
terrain, the type of trip, and the weight of the members in the hunting
party.'" On the second day of the trip, the plaintiff saddled and bridled
his horse, and then, with a rifle slung diagonally across his shoulder, he
mounted the horse.' The horse bucked and threw the plaintiff to the
ground, causing the plaintiff to fracture his neck and hip.'
With regard to the release, the arbitrator concluded that in the absence
of evidence that the plaintiff had specifically authorized the signing of the
release on his behalf or that the plaintiff had ratified the release agree-
ment, the exculpatory provisions of the release could not bind the
plaintif.19 Given the fact that the case arose after the enactment of
Colorado's EALA, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had violated the
EALA and therefore was estopped from relying on the EALA's limited
liability or immunity provisions." 2 However, the arbitrator disagreed,
noting that the defendant appeared to fit within the scope of an "equine
professional" as contemplated within the statute, and stating that a "plain
reading of the act leads me to conclude that the General Assembly
intended to limit the liability of an equine professional, such as [the
defendant stable], to those situations delineated in subsection (4)(b)" of
the EALA." The arbitrator went on to state that he saw "no indication
in [the EALA] that the General Assembly intended to resurrect common
law liability by virtue of an equine professional's disregard or violation
of the statute."''94
With regard to the requisite notice of the inherent risks to be given
to participants who sign contracts with equine professionals, the arbitrator
concluded that even where such notice was not present in the contract,
1'7 Id. at 7.
m Id. at 6-7.
" Id. at 7.
0 Id. at 7-8.
"'Id. at 14. The arbitrator did not discuss the potential effect of the EALA on the
release because the release was deemed invalid.
m' Id. at 10.
'Id. at 12. The text of (4)(b) states that the liability of an equine professional shall
not be prevented or limited in instances where the equine professional "[plrovided the
animal and failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the
participant to engage safely in the equine activity" or "[c]ommit[ted] an act or omission
that constitute[d] willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant" and which
resulted in the participant's injury. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-119(4)(b) (1994).
14 Conger, Case No. 93-341, at 13.
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the legislature did not intend to prevent the equine professional from
relying on the limited liability provisions of the EALA.9 5 Nevertheless,
the arbitrator decided that sufficient notice had been given in the rental
contract, and that such notice was imputed to all the members of the
hunting party through their agent, the signer of the rental agreement."
As for the alleged violations of the EALA, the plaintiff claimed that
the rental stable had failed to determine his ability to safely manage the
horse. However, the arbitrator found insufficient evidence for this
allegation.197 Apparently, the stable evaluated the horse prior to pur-
chase and then again prior to renting the horse out to the public at the
beginning of each season."8 In the two years preceding the incident, the
horse had been rented out in excess of 1000 times, without any report of
any bucking or unruly behavior.'" The arbitrator concluded that the
horse's action on the date of the plaintiff's injury was "not so out of
character for a trailworthy horse as to warrant the conclusion that [it] had
a pre-existing bucking vice,"2' and that the plaintiff "surely knew ...
that a horse otherwise docile can become frightened and unruly when
confronted with some perceived threat to its well-being."' The
arbitrator also noted that in light of the evidence of the stable's program
of risk management, nobody had any reason to believe that the horse that
injured the plaintiff was other than "gentle and trailworthy ''0 and
"suitable for riders with limited riding experience or ability."' 3 The
arbitrator also concluded that the record was "devoid of any evidence of
willful or wanton conduct" by the stable.!"4
In Conger, the arbitrator specifically concluded that the rental stable
was "not estopped from invoking the limited liability provisions of the
Equine Immunity Act"' 5 and that the provisions of the EALA would
determine the stable's liability to the plaintiff.?°' The Colorado EALA
protected the stable from liability in a situation where injury was
determined to have been caused by the inherent risks of horseback riding.
10 Id.
'MId.
'DId. at 15.
'"Id.
'"Id. at 15-16.
" Id. at 16.
201 Id.
" Id.
'm Id. at 17.
2 Id. at 19.
205 Id.
2w Id. at 12-13.
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Where the conduct of the stable had not violated the industry standard of
care as delineated in the EALA, the matter was adjudged according to the
provisions of the EALA, and the stable was entitled to the protection
offered by the EALA.
C. Insurance
The effect EALAs will have on insurance is of the utmost impor-
tance, as one of the purposes of EALAs is to make the horse industry
more insurable. While EALAs were passed primarily to benefit the horse
industry, support for the enactment of these statutes may also be found
in the insurance industry.2 °7
According to a representative of North American Livestock, Inc.
("NAL"), one of the many insurers of the horse industry, the benefits of
EALAs will be felt by both the insurance and the horse industry, since
a reduction in claims will in turn result in a reduction in insurance costs
and premiums.2 NAL, which provides property, casualty and mortality
insurance, is also "strongly considering the introduction of a rate
reduction of five to ten percent for liability to those states which have
passed strong equine laws."2 "9 Additionally, NAL has taken the position
that EALAs will strengthen the effectiveness of release agreements, which
NAL's insureds are required to use.'
The effect on insurance, however, will only be visible after several
years, as premiums and insurance rates are based on litigation rates. As
seen in Colorado and Washington, "test cases" designed to prove
loopholes and exceptions or to interpret various statutory provisions will
inevitably follow the passage of an EALA. Thus, absent initiatives similar
to those suggested by NAL, it may take years before the insurance
industry begins to change premium structures.
IV. PROPOSED MODEL EALA AND COMMENTS
A. Introduction
A new statutory framework would more appropriately resolve the
issues that the current EALAs create or leave unresolved. Therefore, this
Letter from Jim Mitchell, Underwriting Manager, North American Livestock, Inc.,
to the author (Jan. 26, 1994) (on file with author). Special thanks to Jim Mitchell for his
comments.
2M Id.
2W Id.
21 Id.
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section sets forth the following proposed Model EALA (the "Model
EALA")."' The Model EALA is accompanied by comments explaining
how and why it differs in various respects from the existing EALAs
discussed in part WI.2"2
The Model EALA is similar to Colorado's EALA, yet it contains
some modifications.213 The most noteworthy areas of discrepancy lie in
the "engages in equine activity" definition and the "warning sign"
provisions. Other additions are few but important.
The Model EALA deals only with equine activities, to the exclusion
of other recreational or sporting activities. The basic objection to the
"recreational" statutes is that they contain incomplete definitions. For
example, Connecticut and Wisconsin define horseback riding generally
as one of many recreational activities.214 Without further definition or
elaboration, this term is too broad, for not all equine activities are
recreational, nor do they all include "riding." In application, the term
could be narrowly interpreted, thus defeating the purpose of the statute.
On another matter, Wyoming's EALA is more detailed and tries to
incorporate the "inherent risk" concept, but it does so incompletely.1 5
The statute defines inherent risk as "those dangers or conditions which
are an integral part of equine activities or horseback riding." 6 In
comparison to other states' definitions of inherent risk, Wyoming's
definition is simply too vague.
B. The Proposed Model Equine Activity Liability Act
This part of the Article presents a Model EALA with comments
following each section of the Act to explain how and why it differs in
various respects from related sections in existing EALAs.
,,1 The Model EALA was created exclusively by the author.
, See supra notes 106-53 and accompanying text.
211 The author referred to Colorado's BAJA, COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-119 (1994),
in forming the "Model EALA" because the Colorado BALA is quite comprehensive. Also,
many other states have, to a great extent, patterned their EALAs after Colorado's. See,
e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1801 to -1802 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27b-101 to -102
(Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Supp. 1994). However, as discussed in
this section, further refinement might achieve the intended purpose more effectively.
" 1993 Conn. Acts § 286 (Reg. Sess.); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.525(2) (West Supp.
1993).
,5 WYo. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(i).
216 Id. § 1-1-122 (a)(v).
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Equine activities-legislative declaration--exemption from civil
liability.
(1) The Legislature recognizes that persons who participate
in equine activities may incur injuries as a result of the risks
inherent in such activities. The Legislature also finds that the
state and its citizens derive numerous economic and personal
benefits from equine activities and related industry. It is, there-
fore, the intent of the Legislature to encourage equine activities
by limiting the civil liability of those involved in such activities.
Author's explanation: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, New Mexico, and
Tennessee use virtually the same statement of legislative intent.217 In
fact, besides Montana21 and West Virginia2 19 they are the only states
to include a statement of legislative intent in the text of their EALAs. The
statement of legislative intent and purpose used in the Model EALA is
based on those of Alabama and the above-mentioned states.
(2) As used in this section, the following words shall have
the following meanings, unless the context indicates otherwise:
Author's explanation: Those states which include definitions in their
EALAs have definition sections which are practically identical. 2° Thus,
the definitions in the Model EALA are not original. However, the Model
EALA also protects veterinarians and farriers and adds additional detail
to certain areas such as the definitions of "engages in an equine
activity" and "equine activity."
(A) "Engages in an equine activity" shall mean: riding,
training, driving, or in any manner controlling an equine,
2'7 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-337(a) (1994):
The legislature recognizes that persons who participate in equine activities may
incur injuries as a result of the risks involved in those activities. The legislature
also finds that the state and its citizens derive numerous economic and personal
benefits from equine activities. The legislature finds, determines, and declares
that for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, and
to encourage equine activities, this legislation is to limit the civil liability of
those included in equine activities.
" MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-725 (1993).
m W. VA. CODE § 20-4-1 (Supp. 1994).
22 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-9-710 (Law. Co-Op. Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 42-11-1 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-20-102 (1993); VA. CODE
ANN. § 3.1-796.130 (Michie 1994).
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whether mounted or unmounted; being a passenger upon an
equine; assisting in the medical treatment of an equine;
assisting a participant in an equine activity;, assisting manage-
ment at an equine activity, or sponsoring an equine activity.
The term "engages in an equine activity" shall also include
spectating at an equine activity.
Author's explanation: The major difference between the current
EALAs and the Model EALA is that the proposed act includes spectators
of equine activities in the definition of "engages in an equine activity."
All of the state EALAs which provide a definition for this term do not
include spectators, unless the spectator places himself or herself in an
"unauthorized area" and "in immediate proximity to the equine activi-
ty
922 1
This exclusion of spectators presents a problem because, in reality,
attendance at most equestrian events (such as horse shows) places one in
immediate proximity of horses, without necessarily placing one in
immediate proximity of "the equine activity," which is the official event
taking place. Thus, while the premise that a spectator is not a participant
in the event or equine activity is correct, the spectator's "engagement"
may be virtually on par with that of some participants. As such,
spectators, like participants, confront "inherent risks." For example,
spectator parking may be in the same area as horse- trailer parking; often,
spectator parking is ringside. Furthermore, making a statutory distinction
between authorized and unauthorized areas is ridiculous when the
majority of equine events make no such distinction. The average horse
show is not like a professional hockey or football game, where spectators
are separated from the players by plexi-glass walls or fences, or by the
height and detachment of grandstands. Spectating might very well mean
observing a horse from an "arena" which is part of a field cordoned off
with a flimsy and temporary marker or rope.
Thus, for practical reasons, spectators should be included in the
definition of persons engaged in an equine activity. While spectators may
not be entered in the activity or competition, they have every opportunity
to place themselves in immediate and constant proximity to the animals.
22 See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-119(2)(a.5) (1994) ("The term 'engages in an
equine activity' does not include being a spectator at an equine activity, except in cases
where the spectator places himself or herself in an unauthorized area and in immediate
proximity to the equine activity.'.
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(B) "Equine" shall mean a horse, pony, mule, donkey, or
hinny.
Author's explanation: The Model EALA presents a standard defmition
of "equine," and, unlike the Colorado EALA,m on which the Model
EALA was based, does not provide added coverage specifically for
llamas. Most states which include definitions in their EALAs do not
provide coverage for llamas.
(C) "Equine activity" shall be broadly construed to mean:
(i) equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances,
or parades that involve any or all breeds of equines and
any of the equine disciplines, including, but not limited
to, dressage, hunter and jumper shows, grand prix
jumping, three-day events, combined training, rodeos,
driving, pulling, cutting, reining, team penning, barrel
racing, polo, steeplechasing, English and western perfor-
mance riding, endurance and non-endurance trail riding,
western games, hunting, packing, and recreational riding;
(ii) equine or rider training, teaching, testing, or
evaluating, including clinics, seminars and symposiums;
(iii) equine boarding, including normal daily care,
thereof;
(iv) trailering, loading, or transporting an equine;
(v) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine
belonging to another, whether or not the owner has
received some monetary consideration or other thing of
value for the use of the equine or is permitting a pro-
spective purchaser of the equine to ride, inspect, or
evaluate the equine;
(vi) rides, trips, hunts, brandings, roundups, cattle
drives, or other equine activities of any type, however
informal or impromptu, that are sponsored by an equine
activity sponsor;
(vii) placing, replacing, or removing horseshoes
from, or trimming the hooves of, an equine;
(viii) providing or assisting in veterinary treatment or
maintenance care of an equine.
2conO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-119(1) ("The general assembly recognizes that persons
who participate in equine activities or llama activities may incur injuries as a result of the
risks involved in such activities.").
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Author's explanation: While the definition of "equine activity" is
expressly to be construed broadly, the Model EALA nevertheless
specifically expands the standard existing definition to include transport-
ing equines and veterinary and farrier activities. It is logical to include the
activities of all persons involved with the equine.
(D) 'Equine activity sponsor" shall mean an individual,
group, club, partnership, or corporation, whether or not the
sponsor is operating for profit or nonprofit, which sponsors,
organizes, or provides the facilities for an equine activity,
including, but not limited to: pony clubs; 4-H clubs; hunt
clubs; riding clubs; school- and college-sponsored classes,
activities and programs; therapeutic riding programs; and
operators, instructors, and promoters of equine facilities,
including but not limited to stables, clubhouses, ponyride
strings, fairs, training facilities, show grounds and arenas at
which an equine activity is held.
Author's explanation: The standard definition for "equine activity
sponsor" is adopted by the Model EALA. This standard definition is not
expanded upon due to its thoroughness and completeness.
(E) "Equine professional" shall mean a person engaged
for compensation in:
(i) training, teaching, instructing, testing, or evaluat-
ing an equine or participant;
(ii) renting to a participant an equine for the purpose
of riding, driving, or being a passenger upon the equine;
(iii) renting equipment or tack to a participant;
(iv) providing daily care to horses boarded at an
equine facility, or
(v) providing veterinary or maintenance care to an
equine.
Author's explanation: The Model EALA's definition of "equine
professional" is expanded to include persons involved in boarding,
veterinary, or maintenance activities. It is logical to include all persons
involved with the equine, regardless of their roles.
(F) "Inherent risks of equine activities" shall mean those
dangers or conditions which are an integral part of equine
activities, including, but not limited to:
1994-951
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(i) the propensity of an equine to behave in ways that
may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or
around them;
(ii) the unpredictability of an equine's reaction to
such things as sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar
objects, persons, or other animals;
(iii) certain hazards such as surface and subsurface
conditions;
(iv) collisions with other equines, animals, people, or
objects;
(v) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent
manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or
others, such as failing to maintain control over the animal
or to act within his or her ability.
Author's explanation: The Model EALA uses the "inherent risk"
format adopted by the standard EALAs. This format most accurately
deals with the problems and issues arising from injuries related to equine
activity. Most often these injuries are the result not of negligence but of
horses behaving like horses-living, thinking, unpredictable animals. At
times, an equine professional is as helpless to control a horse as the
average person would be to control a half-ton cat or dog.
(G) "Participant' shall mean any person, whether amateur
or professional, who engages in an equine activity, whether
or not a fee is paid to participate in the equine activity.
Author's explanation: The standard definition of "participant!' is
adopted by the Model EALA. This standard definition is not expanded
upon due to its thoroughness and completeness.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, an
equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, a participant, a
doctor of veterinary medicine, a farrier, or any other person,
including but not limited to, a corporation or partnership, shall
not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant
resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities; and, except
as provided in subsection (4) of this section, no participant nor
participant's representative shall make any claim against, maintain
an action against, or recover from an equine activity sponsor, an
equine professional, a participant, a doctor of veterinary medi-
cine, a farrier, or any other person for injury, loss, damage, or
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death of the participant resulting from any of the inherent risks
of equine activities.
Author's explanation: The standard definition is generally adopted by
the Model EALA, but it is expanded to include veterinarians and farriers,
as it is only logical to include all persons involved with the equine,
regardless of their roles.
(4) (A) Nothing in subsection (3) of this section shall prevent
or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor, an equine
professional, or any other person if the equine activity sponsor,
equine professional, or person:
(i) (a) provided the equipment or tack and knew or
should have known that the equipment or tack was
faulty or defective, and such fault or defect caused
the injury, or
(b) provided the equine and failed to make
reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the
ability of the participant to engage safely in the
equine activity and to determine the ability of the
participant to safely manage the particular equine
based on the participant's representation of his or her
ability;,
(ii) owns, leases, rents, or otherwise is in lawful
possession and control of the land or facilities upon
which the participant sustained injuries because of a
dangerous latent condition which was known or should
have been known to the equine activity sponsor, equine
professional, or person and for which warning signs have
not been conspicuously posted;
(ifii) commits an act or omission that constitutes
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the partici-
pant, and that act or omission caused the injury;,
(iv) intentionally injures the participant.
Author's explanation: The Model EALA uses the same industry
standard of due care that appears in the vast majority of EALAs: that is,
to refrain from providing faulty tack or equipment, to refrain from
intentionally injuring, and to determine, based on the participant's
representations, the ability of the participant to safely participate in the
equine activity and manage the animal This standard is not expanded
upon due to its thoroughness and completeness.
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(B) This section shall not apply to the horse or mule
racing industry.
(C) Nothing in subsection (3) of this section shall prevent
or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor, an equine
professional or any person under the liability provisions as
set forth in the product liability laws.
Author's explanation: The Model EALA is inapplicable to the horse
racing industry, and it in no way interferes with product liability laws, as
EALAs are not meant to preclude causes of action arising under other
statutes.
(5) (A) No participant or parent or guardian of a partici-
pant who has knowingly executed a waiver of his or her
rights to sue or recover from an equine activity sponsor, an
equine professional or any other person may maintain an
action against or recover from an equine activity sponsor, an
equine professional or any other person, for an injury to or
the death of a participant engaged in an equine activity and
resulting from an inherent risk associated with equine
activities.
(B) A waiver is required in order to give notice to the
executor of the waiver of the risks inherent in equine
activities. To be valid, it must specify:
(i) the propensity of an equine to behave in ways that
may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or
around them;
(ii) the unpredictability of an equine's reaction to
such things as sounds, sudden movement and unfamili
objects, persons, or other animals;
(iii) certain hazards such as surface and subsurface
conditions;
(iv) collisions with other equines, animals, people, or
objects;
(v) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent
manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or
others, such as failing to maintain control over the animal
or to act within his or her ability.
(C) A valid waiver shall remain valid unless expressly
revoked by the participant or parent or guardian of a partici-
pant. In the case of school- or college-sponsored classes,
activities, or programs, waivers executed by a participant or
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parent or guardian of a participant shall apply to all equine
activities in which the participant is involved in the next
succeeding twelve-month period unless earlier expressly
revoked in writing.
Author's explanation: As discussed in part Il many of the
EALAs include provisions for warning signs to be posted prominently in
locations near and around equine activity facilities in order to inform
participants of the limited liability protection afforded by the statute in
the particular state. The problem with the posting of warning signs and
notices is that these devices will provide the only exposure that the
average lay person will have to the EALA. While this result should not
be a surprise to anyone, the bigger problem is that the average lay person
with no equine experience will have no idea what the "inherent risks of
equine activities" are. Additionally, no purpose would be served by
including the statutory definition of that term on the signs, because the
longer the sign, the less likely it will be read at all. Thus, unless the
participant is specifically aware of what the inherent risks are, posting a
sign is pointless.
The Model EALA does not provide for the placing of prominent
warning notices. Instead it simply confines the warning notice to a pre-
participation release or waiver which a participant is required to sign. The
statutory definition of "inherent risks of equine activities" must be
included in the waiver/release and prominently located and highlighted in
order for the waiver/release to be valid. Participants are more likely to
read a notice which they are required to sign than they are to read a dusty
sign on the side of a barn or riding arena. Maine and Virginia are the
only states which have done anything similar, and the Model EALA
is based on such a premise.
Another important reason for this provision arises in states which
recognize the doctrine of assumption of risk. A defendant equine
professional attempting to avoid litigation by claiming a release as a
contractual assumption of the risks "inherent" in equine activities would
likely discover the release invalid if the participant did not subjectively
understand those risks' Thus, it is of the utmost importance to include
a statement of those risks for the participant at the time of signing the
m See supra pp. 15-23.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 7, § 4104-A (West Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-
296.132(B) (Michie 1994).
'u See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D cmt b (1965).
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release. Merely citing to the statute does not give the participant any
subjective awareness of the inherent risks which he or she is about to
assume.
Furthermore, in the absence of a posting requirement, the required
release gives notice to the participant of the inherent risks of equine
activities. Such notice is important in the event a plaintiff attempts to
circumvent an EALA by bringing a claim for negligent failure to inform
of inherent risks. The defenses afforded by the doctrine of assumption of
risk or by an EALA would be precluded by such lack of notice, since one
of the touchstones to such defenses is that the risk was known to the
plaintiff when encountered. Thus, the importance of imparting upon the
participant a subjective awareness of the inherent risk about to be
assumed is not to be overlooked.
CONCLUSION
EALAs aim to reduce the frequency of litigation associated with
equine activities by eliminating liability for certain inherent risks. Once
achieved, this result in turn will cause less time and money to be spent
on legal matters and more time and money to be spent on the pursuit of
equine activities, which will benefit the equine, recreation, and tourism
industries of the states where EALAs have been enacted. Eventually, less
litigation will mean lower insurance rates for those seeking insurance, and
fewer costs will mean greater profit.
In conclusion, EALAs will benefit equine professionals in the manner
intended by providing them with a statute and proof of legislative intent
to limit their civil liability in matters arising from the inherent risks of
equine activities. The provisos restricting the operative effect of the
immunity provisions basically define the generally accepted industry
standard of care and codify the common law definition of negligence in
the industry.
[Vol 83
